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This paper develops a model positing a nonlinear relationship between public investment
and growth. The model is then applied to a panel of African countries using nonlinear
estimating procedures. The growth-maximizing level of public investment is estimated at
about 10% of GDP based on System GMM estimation. The paper further runs simula-
tions, obtaining the constant optimal public investment share that maximizes the sum of
discounted consumption as between 8:1% and 9:6% of GDP. Compared with the observed
end-of-panel mean value of no more than 7:26 percent, these estimates suggest that there
has been signicant public under-investment in Africa.
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41. Introduction
The gap separating the worlds rich and poor countries remains startling. In 2007, per-
capita income in the United States was at least thirty times higher than in eighteen Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries.1 Compared to Ethiopia and Tanzania, for instance, the
United States has a per-capita income that is more than thirty-eight and forty-six times
larger, respectively, when measured in terms of purchasing power parity. Put di¤erently,
a typical individual in Tanzania has to work more than a month and a half to earn what
his counterpart in the United States earns in a day. Di¤erences in economic growth rates
compounded over long periods of time account for these di¤erences. Fortunately, endogenous
growth theory suggests that there is something we can do about it.
One of the most important contributions of the newgrowth theory is the insight into
the role of scal policy in long-run growth. In his seminal contribution, Barro (1990) argues
that when the private rate of return of capital is lower than its social rate, optimal allocation
calls for further capital accumulation. In this case, public investment becomes important
for long-run growth. A vast theoretical literature on endogenous growth underscores the
importance of scal policy, in the form of public capital ow and stock, for economic growth
(e.g., Ziesemer, 1990, Futagami et al., 1993, Glomm and Ravikumar, 1994, 1997,Turnovsky,
1997, 2000, Agenor et al., 2008, Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis, 2010).
Existing empirical evidence is mixed, however, due to mainly methodological and model
specication issues as well as due to di¤erences in samples. Recent estimates of the elasticity
of output with respect to public capital range from zero to a value that is higher than the
output elasticity of private capital, for instance.2 Fedderke and Bogetic (2009) presented ve
reasons for the contradictory empirical ndings: the presence of nonlinearity; crowding out
e¤ect; endogeneity; an indirect or complementarity e¤ect (rather than a direct productivity
e¤ect); or problems of aggregation. We address in this paper the rst four of these reasons
while providing a more comprehensive analysis of optimal public investment, with a focus
on SSA countries.
5The issue of the optimal level of public investment is under-researched for SSA, as much
of the discussion in the literature has been on attracting private investment to this region.
However, Foster and Briceno-Garmendia (2010) argue that countries in SSA lag behind their
developing countriespeers in any measure of infrastructure. According to these authors,
there are in particular signicant di¤erences among SSA and other low- and middle-income
countries in terms of paved roads, telephone mainlines, and power generation, with SSA
possessing less than four, seven and eight times the respective infrastructure units than
their counterparts. The cost of infrastructure service in SSA is, furthermore, twice more
expensive than elsewhere. In contrast, Devarajan et al. (2001, 2003) argue that most African
countries have already public over-investment, probably the result of creating rent-seeking
opportunities. This ambiguity is likely explained by the implied low quality of public
investment due to ine¢ cient public allocation. However, as African governments seem to
have improved governance in the more recent period, it is expected that higher quality would
now accompany a given quantity of public investment.
Moreover, although the literature on the impact of public capital on economic growth
has grown voluminous in the past few decades, only very few studies have addressed Africa
(Ayogu, 2007). In particular, the issue of the growth-maximizing levels of public capital for
African economies is yet to be addressed, as existing studies tend to employ linear models.3
Nonlinear models have been applied to data from other parts of the world, however.4
The relevant question for policy is not only whether public capital is productive, that is,
whether or not a unit increment on public capital stock increases output or growth, but
also whether public capital is overall growth-enhancing given that it diverts resources from
other activities (Romp and de Haan, 2007, Canning and Pedroni, 2008). The reason is that
public capital can have a negative as well as a positive e¤ect on the economy. Even though
an adequate and e¢ cient supply of public capital promotes output and growth, the burden
resulting from nancing it may have an adverse e¤ect as well, such as the crowding-out of
private capital. A highly enhanced transportation system, for instance, could improve the
6e¢ ciency of trucks, but overly burdensome taxes to nance it could deter the accumulation
of these trucks (Aschauer, 1998). Should the private sector not receive a net advantage from
the infrastructure development, there would be no increase in output. It is this phenomenon
that mainly gives rise to the nonlinearity between public capital and growth.
This paper rst develops a simple endogenous growth model in an overlapping-generation
framework. It then estimates the implied nonlinear relationship between public investment
and economic growth, resulting from a positive infrastructure e¤ect but a potentially negative
taxation e¤ect.5 The growth-maximizing level of public investment is determined by applying
nonlinear estimation techniques to dynamic panel data from SSA countries. Estimation of
dynamic panel models with xed e¤ects gives consistent estimates, with only a weak bias
when there is a su¢ ciently long time period. Given the relatively small sample in time
dimension, we estimate the growth model using non-linear System GMM. In contrast, earlier
studies that estimate the elasticity of output of public capital in nonlinear models usually
apply simple calibration (e.g., Aschauer, 2000a, Miller and Tsoukis, 2001) or nonlinear least
squares methods (e.g., Kamps, 2005), or simply use cross-country analysis, which runs the
risk of taking into account only the short-term e¤ects (see Glomm and Ravikumar 1997).
Limiting the growth impact of public investment to its direct e¤ects, however, may provide
a poor indicator of its importance in the economy. This is because public investment is
likely to a¤ect other important variables such as private investment. Moreover, policy-
induced changes of growth may in turn inuence population growth, for instance, with
further implications for growth. The current paper, therefore, attempts to capture these
indirect e¤ects through formulating and estimating a system of di¤erence equations that
account for the mutual interaction among output growth, public and private investments
and population growth.
In addition to estimating the growth equation, we regress public investment on private
investment and conversely, in order to account for possible crowding-in (complementarity)
and crowding-out e¤ects. We also treat population growth endogenously. The resulting
7equations are estimated separately and also together as a system of simultaneous equations
in order to account for possible correlation across equations. Finally, we run simulations in
order to further examine the issue of policy optimality using coe¢ cient estimates from both
the separate- and simultaneous-equations models.
Among our ndings is that public investment has a positive e¤ect on growth. Perhaps more
interestingly, the growth maximizing public investment/GDP ratio is estimated to be above
10:0 percent, which is larger than the mean observed value of no more than 7:26 percent at
the end of the sample period.6 Furthermore, from the policy simulation experiment, the sum
of the discounted future consumption gain is maximized when there is a public investment
share in GDP of between 8:1 and 9:6 percent.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we provide the theoretical
model. Sections 3 and 4 present the empirical estimation and the simulations, respectively.
Section 5 contains the conclusion.
2. Theoretical model
In neoclassical growth models, exogenous technical progress is the source of long-run
growth, leaving no room for policy decisions to have long-term e¤ects on economic growth.
Therefore, a shock to the public policy variable will have a transitory e¤ect on the economy,
a¤ecting only the level of (long-run) output. By contrast, in endogenous growth models,
policies may have a lasting impact on growth rates. Hence, in these models, a shock to
public capital may inuence both the long-run growth rate and the output level.
In this section, we develop a simple endogenous growth model in an overlapping-generations
framework where agents live two periods. The model captures the nonlinear relationship be-
tween public capital and growth that will form the basis for the empirical analysis in a later
section of the paper.7
The model allows for the capital stock to be long-lasting. In contrast to standard models
(see, for e.g., Barro, 1990, Futagami et. al., 1993, Glomm and Ravikumar, 1994, 1997,
8Turnovsky, 2000, 2004, Hashimzade and Myles, 2010), aggregate capital may depreciate
nonlinearly. Capital is assumed to be heterogeneous, so that current investment may not
add to the existing stock on a one-to-one basis.8 The model also allows adjustment cost of
capital in the spirit of Lucas and Prescott (1971), Basu (1987) and Basu et al. (2012).9 It
explicitly captures the nonlinear relationship between both the ow and the stock of public
capital and economic growth, and their respective growth maximizing levels are derived.
2.1. The model
Consumers
We use an overlapping-generations model with logarithmic preferences and technologies
of a representative agent, as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1997). When young, that is, during
the rst period of life, the individual is endowed with a unit of labor, which she supplies to
the representative rm inelastically. Her income is equal to the wage income (wt). The gov-
ernment taxes this income at a xed at rate tax ( ), in order to nance public investment.
The individual allocates after-tax income between current consumption (ct) and saving (skt ).
When old, she consumes (ct+1) what she has saved in the previous period plus the after-tax
return from saving.10
u (ct; ct+1) = ln ct +  ln ct+1 (1)
ct + s
k
t = (1   )wt (2)
ct+1 = (1 + rt (1   )) skt (3)
where rt is the interest rate, net of the depreciation and the adjustment costs of capital.
Private capital is accumulated according to the following equation, following Lucas and
Prescott (1981), Basu (1987) and Basu et al. (2012),
9kt+1 = (kt)
1   kt (1  ) + skt  (4)
where ,  and kt represent the depreciation cost, the adjustment cost and the private
capital stock, respectively. Therefore, the model explicitly allows installation cost for new
investment and depreciation cost. When  = 0, adjustment cost is too high to change both
private and public capital. But when  = 1, adjustment cost is zero, and capital stocks
are accumulated according to the perpetual inventory method (e.g., kt+1 = kt (1  ) + skt ).
When  2 (0; 1), adjustment cost is di¤erent from zero. Current investment adds to the
stock of capital after adjustment made for installation costs.
Government
The government budget is assumed to be always balanced and given by,
sgt = yt (5)
where sgt and yt, are public investment and aggregate income, respectively.
The public capital accumulation equation is given by,
Gt+1 = (Gt)
1  (Gt (1  ) + sgt ) (6)
Similar to (4),  and  are the depreciation rate and the adjustment cost associated to the
public capital stock (Gt).11
Firms
The production function of the representative rm has the Cobb-Douglas form:
10
yt = A (Gt)
 (kt)
1  (7)
where yt denotes output. As a simplifying assumption, labor is standardized to be unity
(lt = 1).
The rm maximizes prot within a competitive economy setting, taking prices and public
capital as given,
max
kt

A (Gt)
 (kt)
1    wt  Rtkt
	
(8)
where Rt denotes the cost of capital, including a rental price for a unit of capital paid to
households (rt) and adjustment and depreciation costs. The rst-order condition for prot
maximization thus gives,
Rt = (1  )A (Gt) (kt)  (9)
And, the zero-prot condition in the competitive economy leads to the wage rate,
wt = A (Gt)
 (kt)
1  (10)
Competitive equilibrium
The representative household of period t solves the following problem, obtained by sub-
stituting (2) and (3) into (1),
11
max
skt

ln
 
(1   )wt   skt

+  ln (1 + (1   )rt) skt
	
(11)
taking prices as given. The optimization yields,
skt = (1   )wt= (1 + ) (12)
Eq. (12) shows the agents optimal saving as a function of her wage income. Dividing
both sides by (yt), and using (5) and (10), one obtains
skt =yt = (1  sgt=yt)= (1 + ) (13)
Thus, eqs. (12) and (13) capture the crowding-out e¤ect of the public variable through
taxation. Using logarithmic preference and production functions and exogenous labour sup-
ply implies a non-distortionary transfer of income from the private to the public sector of
the economy.12
Capital dynamics and growth
We get the dynamics of the private capital stock, rst by substituting eq. (12) into eq.
(4), and using (10),
kt+1 = kt (1   + A(1   ) (Gt=kt)) (14)
where   = (1 + ).
The di¤erence equation for the public capital stock is computed, by substituting (5) into
12
(6), and using (7), as:
Gt+1 = Gt
 
1   + A (Gt=kt) 1

(15)
Equations (14) and (15) characterize the dynamics of the economy during the transition.
They explicitly demonstrate complementarities among public and private capital. On the
other hand, (14) captures the crowding-out e¤ect of public investment, through a negative
relationship between taxation ( ) and private capital accumulation (kt+1).
From (14) and (15), we obtain the following di¤erence equation for the public-private
capital ratio,
Gt+1=kt+1 = (Gt=kt)
  
1   + A (Gt=kt) 1

= (1   + A(1   ) (Gt=kt))

(16)
The log-linearized version of eq. (16) is shown to be stable in Appendix A.
On the balanced growth path, considering (16), the public-private capital stock ratio is
constant:
G=k =  = ((1   )) (17)
Also, from (7), y=k is constant. Therefore, the capital stocks and output grow at the same
rate y:
y  ln (Gt+1=Gt) = ln (kt+1=kt) = ln (yt+1=yt) (18)
13
Growth maximizing public capital stock and ow
Using (14), y is easily computed,
y =  ln (1   + A(1   ) (Gt=kt)) (19)
Solving for  from (17) and substituting the result into (19), we obtain
y =  ln (1   + A (G=k) = ( (G=k) + 1)) (20)
Eq. (20) represents the growth rate of the economy as a function of the steady-state
public-private capital stock ratio G=k. The last term captures the nonlinear relationship
between economic growth and the public-private capital ratio.
The public-private capital stock ratio ((G=k)) that maximizes the growth rate (20) is,
(G=k) = (1 + ) = ((1  )) (21)
With regard to the ow of public capital (public investment), we substitute (17) into (19),
and use (5) to replace the tax rate, and obtain
y =  ln
 
1   + A1 (1  sgt=y)1  (sgt=y)

(22)
Eq. (22) shows the growth rate of the economy as a function of the public investment-output
ratio (sg=y). Maximizing it with respect to sg=y, we get the following familiar result,
14
(sg=y) =  (23)
Therefore, (23) is the growth-maximizing productive government expenditure, which bal-
ances the negative taxation and the positive productive e¤ects of public investment on the
economy, as does the stock of public capital in eq. (20). This is also the optimal public
investment when  = 1 and  = 1 (see, for e.g., Barro, 1990 and Futagami et al., 1993).
Both (22) and (23) will be referred to in the next section for empirical estimation. Par-
ticularly, we estimate (22) with standard control variables and determine the optimal public
investment ratio (23), using data from SSA. We then compare this result with the average
of the actual public investment-GDP ratio that these countries have.
3. Estimation
This section empirically examines the nonlinear relationship between the ow of public
capital (public investment) and output growth using panel data from SSA countries, as data
on public capital stock are often limited and unreliable.13 It also analyzes complementarities
and crowding-out e¤ects between public and private investment. We estimate not only the
growth model of Section 2 but also a system of di¤erence equations involving population
growth and economic growth, as well as public investment and private investment. Estima-
tions of equations are conducted both separately and simultaneously using nonlinear System
GMM.
The rst estimation equation is a growth equation, based on (22), that regresses per capita
GDP growth on public investment and other control variables (lagged dependent variable,
private investment, and population growth). The second and third estimation equations
characterize the dynamics of the private and public capital ows. The fourth is a population
growth equation that regresses population growth on lagged population growth and GDP per
15
capita variables. These four equations constitute a system of macroeconomic dynamics that
captures the mutual interaction among public investment, private investment, population
growth and output growth.14 The estimation of the growth equation yields the growth-
maximizing level of public investment. We compare this estimate with the optimal level of
public investment , which is loosely dened as the constant level of public investment that
maximizes the sum of discounted consumption gain ,15 obtained from simulating the system
of equations.
3.1. Data
The panel data used in the study cover 33 SSA countries, for the period 1967 to 2011.16
The data for GDP per capita are obtained from PWT 8.0 (Feenstra et al., 2013) while
the data for the public and private investment variables are extracted from the African
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012). Data for population and world income are
from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012). Public investment includes only
xed capital investment by governments and non-nancial enterprises. We use the output
version of GDP panel data from PWT 8.0, which has no terms of trade e¤ects (in contrast
to the expenditure version) and is consistent with growth rates over changing benchmarking
(Feenstra et al., 2013) . For world income, we use world GDP in constant 2005 US$.
Table 1 provides summary statistics, denitions and data sources of the variables used in
the estimation. The average public investment of these countries over the sample period is
6:06 percent of real GDP but it is 7:26% at the end of the sample period, 2008 to 2011. The
average growth rate of real GDP per capita is 0:6 percent for the sample periods. This rises
to 2:3% by the end of the period.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
3.2. Econometric Methods
We estimate the dynamic panel equations, rst, separately and, second, together, as a
simultaneous equations system using System GMM.17 All methods include cross-section xed
16
e¤ects (FE) and time dummies. As we are dealing with a dynamic problem we want to
emphasize the time dimension rather than the cross-section dimension. We thus make three
choices: First, we use yearly data rather than 5-year averages, making the time dimension
longer.18 Second, we use FE methods rather than OLS and random e¤ects (RE), based on
the Hausman test that rejects RE. Finally, we use system GMM, which adds an equation in
rst di¤erences to one in levels thereby emphasizing growth rates rather than levels.
Although FE estimations of dynamic panel data are biased, the bias approaches zero for a
large time-dimension sample size (Bond, 2002). As a general rule, this bias is of order 1=T ,
where T represents time-dimension. Thus, it is su¢ ciently small for T = 30 or more (see,
for e.g., Judson and Owen, 1999, Baltagi, 2008, Ch.8). In our data, the time dimension T is
on average 25 years, based on the average of 848 observations for 33 countries, leading to a
4% bias in the coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable. Hence the xed e¤ects estimates
could su¤er from a downward bias in the coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable, which
may in turn a¤ect the coe¢ cient of the public investment variable.
We, therefore, present nonlinear estimates based on the System GMM method. The Sys-
tem GMM version uses one equation in rst di¤erences with lagged levels as instruments
and one within-groups estimator equation in levels using lagged rst di¤erences as instru-
ments.19 The coe¢ cients of the two equations then are restricted to be the same for the
level variables and their counterparts in the rst di¤erence equation. Alternatively, the rst
di¤erence equation could be replaced by the Arellano and Bover (1995) method of orthogonal
deviations. Implementation of non-linear items is more easily tractable in the rst di¤erence
version of System GMM given the complexity of the orthogonal deviation model. On the
other hand, the orthogonal deviation method has the advantage of losing fewer observations
in case of missing values (Roodman, 2006).20
We apply the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for the endogeneity of regressors other than the
lagged dependent variable (see Appendix B). The basic principle is to run the rst stage
regressions, save the residuals and add them to the rst stage regression. This is then esti-
17
mated in least-squares, because adding residuals turns it into an IV regression according to
the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem. If the residuals are signicant the corresponding variables
are endogenous (see Wooldridge, 2002); if not they are exogenous or predetermined. We do
the rst stage regression for both equations of the system GMM method separately, apply-
ing the FE estimator with cross-section GLS weights. Then we add the saved residuals to
the GMMSYS estimations and estimate them using the SUR method because the di¤erence
equation has a residuals di¤erence, u(0)-u(-1), and the level equation its rst term. In the
special case where the level equation endogeneity is rejected but the di¤erence equation in-
dicates endogeneity we can conclude that the level of the regressor is not correlated with its
current residual and its lagged value not with that of the lagged residual. By implication the
correlation of x-x(-1) with u(0)-u(-1) can stem either from a correlation of x(-1) with u(0),
implying forward endogeneity, or of x with u(-1), implying that x(-1) is predetermined. In
the latter case x(-2) should be used as an instrument (Baltagi, 2008). A similar procedure
has been suggested by Yontcheva and Masud (2005).
Instruments should not only reduce the standard error but also increase the J-statistic
through the impact on over-identifying constraints. On the other hand, the J-statistic should
not go too high. By implication the p-value of the di¤erence in the J-statistic should be
reasonably far away from both zero and unity according to the di¤erence in Sargan-Hansen
test. However, in the nal version we have only one instrument per regressor in line with
Okui (2009) and no such test is necessary and the Hansen-Sargan J-statistic is close to zero
(or its p-value is close to unity) because of absence of over-identifying constraints up to the
number of constraints on the coe¢ cients.
First-order serial correlation should be limited in general but is inevitable in the orthog-
onal deviation version of system GMM, which is thus not a problem. Second-order serial
correlation should be limited in order not to undermine the e¤ect of the instruments on the
J-statistic. It is tested in terms of di¤erences of the residuals. The Arellano-Bond test for
the di¤erence GMM is only valid for coe¢ cients above 0:2 (see Roodman, 2009b). The cru-
18
cial test then is the requirement that the Sargan-Hansen J-statistic should not be too high
in order to be in the chi-square distribution and it should not be too low to have e¤ective
instruments. The corresponding p-values should not be close to zero or unity (Roodman,
2009a). However, when 1=T is small only a small correction is needed and the p-values may
be close to unity.
Bun and Windmeijer (2010) have pointed out that the Monte-Carlo studies underlying
the system GMM method have assumed a ratio of the variances of the xed e¤ects and
the residuals of unity. If the ratio is much higher system GMM may produce a bias for
the coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable. Reporting this ratio is therefore a crucial
ingredient, in justifying the use of system GMM.
Clemens and Bazzi (2009) show for the case of one additional endogenous regressor that
the correlation of the residuals of the model equation and that of the endogenous regressors
regressed on its own lagged should be low. As we have this case we also report that correlation
(see Appendix B).
3.3. Separate equations estimations with System GMM
3.3.1. Growth equation
We now estimate the possible nonlinear relationship between the ow of public capital and
growth using panel data from SSA countries based on equations from the model developed
in Section 2. First, we employ eq. (22),21 with standard control variables - lagged dependent
variable, lagged private investment as a share of GDP, population growth rate and the
world GDP22 - to determine whether there exists a nonlinear relationship between public
investment and growth. Then, we obtain an estimate for the output elasticity of public
capital (). Finally, we use the estimated value for  and eq. (23), in order to obtain the
growth-maximizing rate of public investment, which can then be compared to the existing
value of the panel average at the end of the period and results from a simulation analysis.
Rewriting (22) (with no adjustment cost and complete depreciation), including standard
19
control variables and error terms, in a panel form, we have
ln (yit) = a1 ln (yit 1) + (1  ) ln (1  (sg=y)it) +  ln (sg=y)it
+a2 ln
 
sk=y

it 1 + a3p;it + a4
2
p;it + a5
3
p;it + a6 ln (wld) + ei + t + uit (24)
where
 
sk=y

it 1, p;it and wld denote a one period lagged private investment-GDP ratio,
population growth23 and the world income, respectively. ei, t, and uit are the xed e¤ects,
the time dummy and the error terms, respectively. Eq. (24) thus shows a dynamic panel
data model, where we have rewritten (22) with growth expressed di¤erence in log income
levels and have specied control variables explicitly.24
We rst estimate (24) separately using the rst di¤erence approach to System GMM.25
The result is as follows (t-values in parentheses):
ln (yit) = :97
(72:8)
ln (yit 1) + :8983
(14:5)
ln (1  (sg=y)it) + :1017
(14:5)
ln (sg=y)it + :066
(6:7)
ln
 
sk=y

it 1
+3:47
(3:2)
p;it   70:1
( 5:5)
2p;it + 355:5
(3:5)
3p;it + :059
(4:5)
ln (wld) + ei + t + uit (25)
The coe¢ cient for the lagged dependent variable is signicant, and at 0:97 it indicates the
persistence of output. The fact that the estimated coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent value
does not di¤er signicantly from unity suggests that the theoretical model is reasonable
for our SSA sample.26 The coe¢ cient of the world income variable is also positive and
signicant. The nonlinear coe¢ cient estimate of public investment, the growth maximizing
level of public investment as denoted by  in the theoretical model, is thus estimated at
0:102, with standard error 0:007. This result suggests, then, the need to increase public
investment, as percent of GDP, from its 7:26 percent level at the end of the sample period,
for a growth maximizing policy. The coe¢ cient for private investment share is 0:066 percent
and is also signicant. The population growth rate is signicant (in all of its form) and
has an asymmetric inverted u-shape with a maximum at 3:3%, a value achieved around
1983   85. Note that our percent estimate of the optimal level of public investment is, in
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general, smaller than most of those in the recent literature (see Section 1).
3.3.2. Private investment equation
Public investment is believed to have both complementary and crowding-out e¤ects on pri-
vate investment. In the growth model, eqs. (12) and (13) show that public investment crowds
out private investment. Eqs. (14) and (15), on the other hand, capture complementarities
between the stock variables.27
Our second estimation equation is a regression of private investment on public investment,
both as shares of GDP. We set up the model intended to empirically determine the net e¤ects
of crowding-in and crowding-out of public investment. We include six year lagged public
investment in a cubic specication.28
For estimation, we use System GMM in its orthogonal deviation variant by Arellano and
Bover (1995):
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The rst term of equation (26) denotes lagged private investment while the second rep-
resents two-periods lagged private investment. The third term, one-period lagged GDP per
capita growth rate, captures the accelerator mechanism; higher lagged growth is expected
to lead to a higher level of current investment. The fourth to sixth term is the cubic public
investment variable having a maximum at 9:5%. This value is fairly close to that of the
growth equation.29
3.3.3. Public investment equation
Our third estimation equation treats public investment as the dependent variable where
the lags of public, changes in private investment and growth rates are the independent
variables. This formulation is in considers policy responses that policy makers often react
to changes in macroeconomic variables. For instance, an increase in private investment or
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stronger growth may lead to a change in public investment policy:
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We estimate equation (27) using the orthogonal deviation method of Arellano and Bover
(1995) for System GMM. Government action is self-perpetuating, as indicated by the coef-
cient for the lagged dependent variable of 0:8. Changes in lagged private investment have
a net positive e¤ect on public investment. Finally, current GDP per capita growth has a
positive impact as it could increase the revenues available for public spending.
3.3.4. Population growth equation
Our fourth estimation equation is a population growth equation. Recall that we want to
run simulations of a system that characterizes the macroeconomic dynamics of the economy
in order to further examine the optimal public investment, and also analyze its e¤ects on
the economy. So far we have three equations (eqs. (24), (26) and (27)) but four endogenous
variables (income, public and private investment and population growth).
The fourth equation is:
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The data used for estimating (28) have more than thirty observations per country. Thus,
the FE bias is su¢ ciently small. Therefore, we estimate it with xed e¤ects, using lagged
levels as instruments, while taking into account the period-SUR version of panel corrected
standard errors (PCSE) similar to (26) and (27).30 The coe¢ cients of lagged values of
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population growth sum up to about 0:95. The adjusted R2 is 0:98. The sum of all lagged
income coe¢ cients is negative in line with the standard demographic transition.
3.4. A simultaneous equation system with System GMM
We estimate eqs. (24), (26), (27) and (28) as a simultaneous equations system as well.31
Using System GMM enables us to deal with both endogeneity and contemporaneous corre-
lation. We set up the system in which we write each of the rst three equations as a System
GMM estimator model, once in rst-di¤erences and once in levels, subtracting the country-
specic averages of each variable (the within estimator). The fourth equation is written
only in levels as a within-groups estimator (xed-e¤ects) model. This approach combines
the strength of the SUR estimator, taking into account relations between the residuals of
the equations, and that of the System GMM estimator, taking into account xed e¤ects and
endogeneity without imposing a normality assumption on the residuals. The following are
the results from the simultaneous estimations (t-ratios in parentheses):
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Across the two approaches (of separate and simultaneous), coe¢ cients have the same sign
except where collinearity is prominent in the cubic polynomials of public investment, in the
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private investment equations and the lags of the population growth equation. They di¤er
slightly in magnitude, though; and, the coe¢ cient of the growth rate in the public investment
equation di¤ers strongly. Signicance (as measured by t values) is higher throughout in the
simultaneous equation estimate as is usually the case when using SUR or GMM methods in
systems. The two insignicant regressors of the separate estimation growth in the private
investment equation and a lag in the population growth equation become signicant now.
In the separate estimation signicance is basically always better than the 5% level. In the
simultaneous estimation it is always better than the 3% level and mostly zero until the fourth
digit. Comparing the GMM estimates, in the growth equation, most coe¢ cients are larger in
absolute terms in the simultaneous GMM estimations. In the private investment equation,
the opposite is the case (ignoring the di¤erence in the public investment polynomial).32
4. Simulations
In this section, we simulate the system of four equations and conduct policy experiments
in order to determine the public investment GDP share that maximizes sum of discounted
consumption gain and assess the e¤ects on investment, net income, and consumption. Initial
values are constructed from regressing the variables on linear-quadratic time trends, in the
rst ve-to-ten-year period. First, we simulate a benchmark economy with values that
(roughly) match with the panel average of real economies of SSA, particularly during the
end of the sample period.33 Then, we examine the e¤ect of an increase to a certain constant
level of public investment.
4.1. The benchmark economy
The result of the benchmark simulation is shown in Figure 1. Population growth rst
increases and then decreases, consistent with demographic transition. The GDP per capita
growth rate has strong ups and downs captured by time dummies. It has a peak in 1978
just before the second oil crisis and a highly negative value in 1983 through the Latin
American debt crisis, both of which hit SSA severely and led to a "lost decade" (Greene, 1989,
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Humphreys and Underwood, 1989). During the 1982 crisis public and private investment
grow more quickly than GDP and therefore both investment GDP ratios have a small peak.
Part of it goes only into the residuals of our equations because the actual growth rates were
slightly lower during the 1982 crisis. After the crisis, growth resumes (with ups and downs),
and more strongly so after 1990.
FIGURE 1 OVER HERE
The public and private investment/GDP shares are about 6.9 and 10.5 percent, respec-
tively, at the end of the simulation period based on the simultaneous-equations estima-
tion. When using the estimates from the separate regressions, the public and private in-
vestment/GDP shares increase to 10 and 11 percent, respectively.34 For all variables the
simulation values at the end of the sample period are quite close to those of the actual panel
average for 2008-2011 presented in the last column of Table 1.
4.2. Counterfactual analysis: Is public investment optimal in SSA countries?
From Table 1, the actual panel-average of public investment is about 6:1 percent of real
GDP. At the end of the sample period, 2008   2011, the value is 7:26 percent. Meanwhile
the level of public investment that maximizes the growth rate from the nonlinear growth
regressions, is 10:2 percent of GDP. These results imply that on average the public investment
share of output in SSA countries is sub-optimal.
From the simulation and policy experiment, the constant level of the public investment
that maximizes the discounted sum of per capita consumption gain until 2050 is 8:4%, at
three di¤erent discount rates, using estimates from the simultaneous equations regression
(Table 2). Figure 2 plots the e¤ects from increasing public investment to this optimal level.
While public investment increases by about 20% from its benchmark value, consumption
increases, from its benchmark value, by about 3:5%. However, there is a slight decline in
private investment due to taxation and crowding-out e¤ects.
TABLE 2 OVER HERE
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FIGURE 2 OVER HERE
4.2.1. Sensitivity analysis
We also run the simulation using the estimates from the separate equations estimation. In
this case, on average about 9:3 percent of public investment (as a share of GDP) maximizes
the sum of discounted per capita consumption gain until the year 2050 (see Table 2). The
simulation results are shown in Figure 3. Public investment rst goes down but picks up
later on. This is followed by a consumption gain, at rst, due to a reduction in tax but,
later on, due to an increase in income, which, in turn, increases due to an increase in public
investment.
FIGURE 3 OVER HERE
The di¤erence in the simulationsoutcomes is apparently due to di¤erences in the estimates
of the variables, which in turn depend on the estimation methods employed. Both methods
have their own merits. The advantages of the simultaneous equations estimation vis-à-vis the
separate is similar to that of a SUR estimation. It takes into account the contemporaneous
correlation. However, in general, the orthogonal deviation method used in the separate
equation estimation has the advantage of losing fewer observations than rst-di¤erences. But
this is less important in our case, as there are hardly missing observations in the sample.
However, note that, although the values for optimal public investment (Table 2) di¤er
from each other to some extent, they are all larger than the typically observed value of 7:26
percent.35 In addition, they are much smaller than the values, which were reported, by earlier
works, for other areas. For instance, Aschauers (2000a) estimate of the growth maximizing
level of public capital for the US is about 30 percent; Miller and Tsoukiss (2001) for a wide
range of low and middle income countries is 18 percent; Kampss (2005) for European and
OECD countries is 20 percent. On the other hand, they are quite close to Luotos (2011) 10
percent estimate for Finland.
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5. Conclusion
Economists have long acknowledged the importance of public investment. Many believe
public investment enhances productivity and complements private investment, with a pos-
itive impact on long-run growth and welfare. Others argue that the higher taxation, for
instance, resulting from the larger public investment, lowers growth and welfare as it distorts
private saving and e¤orts, thus crowding out private investment. Hence, the relationship
between long-run growth and public investment could be non-monotonic, with the likelihood
of an optimal level of public investment.
The present paper rst developed an endogenous growth model that posited nonlinearity
in the public capital and growth relationship in SSA countries. Using panel data from
SSA countries, from 1967 to 2011, and applying various econometric techniques, the paper
identied the growth-maximizing level of public investment in the region. It found that not
only does public investment highly matter for economic growth but also that the current
level prevailing in SSA is, on average, sub-optimal. Applying separate and simultaneous
equations estimation methodologies, we found growth maximizing public investment GDP
share of about 10:2 percent.
An important aspect of public investment is its indirect impact on growth through private
investment, and conversely. To shed light on this phenomenon, we formulated a system
of di¤erence equations that captured the relationships among output growth, public and
private investment and population growth, and conducted estimation both separately and
simultaneously. Both complementarities and crowding-out e¤ects were detected between
public and private investments while accelerator and net complementarity e¤ects were found
to be stronger under the simultaneous equations estimation. Applying the estimates from
these regressions we then ran simulations to determine the level of public investment that
maximizes the sum of discounted per capita consumption gain. The optimal value was
computed to be between 8:1 percent and 9:6 percent, when using discount rates ranging from
4 percent to 12 percent, and various econometric techniques, respectively. All estimates are
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larger than the observed value of 7:26 percent at the end of the sample period. The present
ndings are, therefore, not in concert with the previous nding of public over-investment in
the region (e.g., Devarajan et al., 2001, 2003). Our estimates are, nevertheless, generally
much lower than those for other regions and country groups.
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Appendix
A. Stability of the capital ratio dynamics
To examine the stability of (16), rst rewrite it, using (17), as:
(Gt+1=kt+1)
1
 (1  ) = (A ) + (Gt+1=kt+1)
1
 (Gt=kt)
 (G=k) 1
= (1  ) = (A ) (Gt=kt)
1
 + (Gt=kt)
 1+ 1
 (A.1)
Then, log-linearize (A.1) near the steady-state capital ratio (G=k), (see Novales, et al.
2010), to obtain
zt+1  zt (A.2)
where zt  ln (Gt=kt)  ln (G=k) and
  1  ((1   )= )
1 
1

 
(1  ) = (A ) + ((1   )= )1  (A.3)
Thus, the root of the log-linearized eq. (A.2) is stable as long as 0 <  < 1, which is the
case since the denominator of the second term of (A.3) is greater than the nominator while
both are positive.
B. Endogeneity and GMMSYS
B.1. Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
The results for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman regarding endogeneity described in the econo-
metrics section of the main text are presented in Table B.1.
TABLE B.1. ABOUT HERE
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Note that we cannot rely on the normality assumption we have to be a bit exible here.
In particular, with a GDP variable in the denominator exogeneity is not very plausible.
Assuming exogeneity leads to a public investment coe¢ cient of 0.13.
B.2. Bias comparison: GMMSYS and FELS (Fixed e¤ects least squares)
Table B.2 shows the coe¢ cients of the lagged dependent variables for GMMSYS and FELS.
In all cases, the standard result that FELS underestimates the coe¢ cients is conrmed.
In the simultaneous estimation case, the di¤erence is larger than the usual 1/T bias for
the investment equations. For the other equations, it is in this order of magnitude and
the di¤erence could be due to having other exogenous and endogenous or predetermined
regressors (see Bruno, 2005 and Clemens and Bazzi, 2009, respectively). If we use the SUR
method in simultaneous equation estimation the coe¢ cients are equal to or larger than those
of GMMSYS. This point may be worth further (econometric) research.
TABLE B.2. ABOUT HERE
B.3. GMM properties for separately estimated equations
The issues discussed in this section are only raised for single equation estimation in the
econometric literature. Therefore we discuss them only for the separate estimation case.
The information related to discussions of GMM is provided in Tables B.2 and B.3 below.
The bias is corrected at a reasonable percentage close to 1/T, which is 4% for the growth
and public investment regressions and 5% for the private investment equation, respectively
(Table B.2).
A mild negative rst-order serial correlation is still present in the public investment equa-
tion, but it is too small to cause a bias. The standard remedy of adding more lags of the
dependent variable is not applied here as it increases the standard error of the regression. If
we add the residual of the regression as in the Breusch-Godfrey test and carry out a GMM-
SYS regression, the result for serial correlation of the growth equation is even stronger and for
the two investment equations becomes the opposite in sign. However, as Roodman (2009a,
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2009b) point out, under orthogonal deviations (which is used in the investment equations)
rst-order serial correlation is built in automatically and inevitably and, therefore, there
should not be a problem econometrically.
The absence of second-order serial correlation, which is important for the e¤ectiveness
of the instruments, can be assured at least at the 5% level (Table B.3). The variance
ratio, the square of the standard deviation of the xed e¤ects and the standard error of the
estimation is not unity as in the Monte Carlo studies, but rather below it. According to
Bun and Windmeijer (2010), this is not critical whereas values above two are problematic
in the absence of other regressors as they might cause a bias in the coe¢ cient of the lagged
dependent variables.
TABLE B.3. ABOUT HERE
The endogenous or predetermined regressors of our growth equation are represented through
investment and population equations. Endogeneity should be weak and system GMM works
better if the correlation of the residuals of all these equations are low (Clemens and Bazzi,
2009). As shown in Table B.4, the correlation coe¢ cients are very low indeed, which indicates
that the endogeneity is not overly strong.
TABLE B.4. ABOUT HERE
B.4. Instruments used and more
B.4.1. Separate estimation
 Growth, di¤erence equation: Obs.: 831
LNRGDPCH(-2), LOG(1-GPBI(-1)/100), LOG(GPBI(-1)/100), LNGPRI(-2), C,
(D(LNPOP))^2, D(LNPOP), (D(LNPOP))^3, LOG(WLD(-2)), time dummies
1967-2009 (other redundant).36
 Growth, level equation: Obs.: 787
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D(LNRGDPCH(-5)), D(LOG(1-GPBI(-1)/100)), D(LOG(GPBI(-1)/100)) D(LNGPRI(-
2)), D((D(LNPOP(-6)))^2), D((D(LNPOP(-6)))), D((D(LNPOP(-6)))^3), C, D(LOG(WLD(-
2))), time dummies 1968-2008 (others redundant).
 Private investment equation (orthogonal deviations; rst and last lag indicated): Obs.:
653
 (LOG(GPRI),-2,-3), (LOG(GPBI(-7))), (LOG(GPBI(-7)))^2, (LOG(GPBI(-7)))^3,
(D(LNRGDPCH),-2,-2), c, time dummies.
 Public investment equation (orthogonal deviations; rst and last lag indicated): Obs.:
828
 (LOG(GPBI),-4,-4), LOG(GPRI(-1))-LOG(GPRI(-2)), D(LNRGDPCH(-2)), time
dummies, c.
 Population growth equation: Obs.: 1407
None (least squares with time and cross-section dummies).
B.4.2. Simultaneous estimation
(J-statistic 0.01985; ivs L= 328, coe¢ cients K=189, L- K=139, p(nJ)=1 )
 Growth, di¤erence equation: Obs.: 831; S.E. of regression: 0.147228
LNRGDPCH(-5), LOG(1-GPBI(-1)/100), LOG(GPBI(-1)/100), LNGPRI(-2), C,
(D(LNPOP))^2, D(LNPOP), (D(LNPOP))^3, LOG(WLD(-5)), time dummies
1967-2008.
 Growth, level equations: Obs.: 787; S.E. of regression: 0.109108
D(LNRGDPCH(-5)), D(LOG(1-GPBI(-1)/100)), D(LOG(GPBI(-1)/100)), D(LNGPRI(-
2)), D((D(LNPOP(-6)))^2), D((D(LNPOP(-6)))), D((D(LNPOP(-6)))^3), C, D(LOG(WLD(-
2))), times dummies 1968-2008.
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 Private investment, di¤erence equation: Obs.: 644; S.E. of regression: 0.432295
LNGPRI(-2), LNGPRI(-3), LOG(GPBI(-7)), LOG(GPBI(-7))^2, LOG(GPBI(-
7))^3, D(LNRGDPCH(-2)), time dummies 1972-2010.
 Private investment, level equation: Obs.: 600; S.E. of regression: 0.329645
D(LNGPRI(-2)), D(LNGPRI(-3)), D(LOG(GPBI(-7))), D(LOG(GPBI(-7))^2),
D(LOG(GPBI(-7))^3), D(D(LNRGDPCH(-2))), time dummies 1973-2010.
 Public investment, di¤erence equation: Obs.: 787; S.E. of regression: 0.440612
LOG(GPBI(-2)), LNGPRI(-1)-LNGPRI(-2), D(LNRGDPCH(-1)), time dummies
1968-2010
 Public investment, level equation: Obs.: 792; S.E. of regression: 0.330517
D(LOG(GPBI(-2))), LNGPRI(-1)-LNGPRI(-2), D(D(LNRGDPCH(-1))), time dum-
mies 1968-2010.
 Population growth equation: Obs.: 1464; S.E. of regression: 0.000872
D(LNPOP(-1)), D(LNPOP(-2)), D(LNPOP(-3)), D(LNPOP(-4)), D(LNPOP(-
5)), LOG(RGDPCH(-2)), LOG(RGDPCH(-3)), LOG(RGDPCH(-6)), time dum-
mies 1967-2010, C.
B.5. Autoregressive process for world income
The autoregressive process for world income, which we use for the simulation is:
ln(wld) = 3:38
(3:73)
+ 1:1
(8:2)
ln (wld( 1))  0:47
( 2:5)
ln (wld( 2))
+0:24
(1:9)
ln (wld( 3)) + 0:003
(3:03)
t
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The adjusted R2 is 0.999. The Durbin-Watson is 2.02 and gets worse when adding the
fth and six lags, (the fourth one is insignicant). Also, we use only three lags in this
auxiliary regression since adding a moving average term could make only a 2% di¤erence in
simulations, in hundreds years.37
Notes
1Based on Penn World Table 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009).
2For instance, using cross country data, Canning (1999), Aschauer (2000b), and Demetriades and Ma-
muneas (2000) estimate elasticity of output for public capital to be as large as that for private capital; though
Miller and Tsoukis (2001) and Kamps (2005) estimate lower values for public capital. On the other hand,
Milbourne et al. (2003) report insignicant e¤ects of public investment. Using country specic data, Ever-
aert and Heylen (2004) and Fedderke et al. (2006) estimate elasticity values of public capital, for Belgium
and South Africa, respectively, from 0.3 to 0.5. Luoto (2011) estimates about 0.1 for Finland.
3For instance, Fedderke et al. (2006) and Fedderke and Bogetic (2009) study the impact of infrastructure
on growth for South Africa, and Ayogu (1999) for Nigeria. Calderon and Serven (2008) and Calderon (2009),
using large panel data sets covering over 100 countries, examine the relationship between infrastructure assets
and growth in SSA; Estache et al. (2005), applying an augmented Solow model with infrastructure variables,
and using pooled OLS study the relationship for 41 SSA countries. Boopen (2006) studies the impact of
transport infrastructure on economic growth for SSA countries, using a dynamic panel model of Di¤erence
GMM method. Devarajan et al. (2001, 2003) examine the productivity of public investment in Africa
employing 2SLS for a cross section of countries.
4For example, Aschauer (2000a) and Kamps (2005) examined the optimality of public capital in the
United States and European countries, respectively, while Miller and Tsoukis (2001) was on a set of low and
middle-income countries. Kalaitzidakis and Tzouvelekas (2011) studied a set of developing and developed
countries with a particular emphasis on military spending.
5The main purpose of the theoretical model is to capture the non-linearity between public investment
and growth. Thus the model may be viewed as a simplifying one; the detailed variables are subsequently
specied under the empirical modelling.
6For the entire period, the observed mean value for public investment/GDP share is lower than 6:1
percent.
7See Kocherlakota and Yi (1996), Aschauer (2000a), Bleaney, et al. (2001) and Kalaitzidakis and Tzou-
velekas (2011) for the application of endogenous growth models.
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8For instance, in the case of public capital, the existing aggregate capital stock consists of past investment
in electricity, telecommunication, roads, etc.
9However, these bodies of literature do not focus on public capital and growth.
10The model is kept simple for sake of tractability and technicality. For instance, population growth is
set to zero, as it could result in scaling e¤ects in growth, though the general results hold under nonzero
population growth. The applications of log-linear preference and production function, and xed at-rate
taxes on income and capital (in contrast to alternative nancing methods) also serve to obtain a tractable
solution. See Angyridis (2014) for models with progressive taxation and heterogenous agents.
11We set similar technological parameters for public and private capital in order to avoid unnecessarily
complicating the model.
12In a logarithmic utility function, the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is unity, and consequently
the income e¤ect of a wage increase exactly compensates the substitution e¤ect (de la Croix and Michel,
2002, p. 1314). We abstract from other tax distortions while we keep the model simple, for our purpose.
13Construction of public capital stock data depends on rather arbitrary assumptions about depreciation
and initial capital stock.
14We focus on these variables due to, both, their particular importance in growth theories and more readily
available data. While the GMM estimation properly accounts for any time or country specic unobserved
heterogeneity, we dont expect major institutional di¤erences (unlike the case of developing countries versus
OECD countries, for instance) within the current sample of African countries.
15The standard denition of optimality is the maximization of the sum of discounted utility given the
resource constraints in the economy. But, we estimate here the constant level of public investment that
maximizes the sum of discounted consumption gains due to its simplicity and better applicability to panel
of countries.
16Countries are included in the study based on the availability of relatively reliable data. These are:
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,
Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Cote dIvoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
17In the working paper version of the paper, we compared the results to weighted least square (WLS) and
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).
18See also Attanasio et al. (2000) for the advantages of annual data (vis-a-vis n-year averages), such as
providing information that is lost when averaging.
19All regressors are thus treated as endogenous, which are instrumented internally using their own lagged
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values. Alternatively, external instruments could also be applied (e.g., Dincecco and Prado, 2012), depending
on data availability and the estimation method used.
20We add time dummies to deal with cross-sectional dependence (see Roodman, 2009b, Smith and Fuertes,
2010).
21We only consider the case when there is complete depreciation of capital and zero adjustment cost,  = 1
and  = 1.
22One may also use a time trend to get similar results. However, note that both population growth and
world income growth show similar downward trends. Thus, omitting the latter may yield a bias in the
coe¢ cient of the former.
23Population growth is highly signicant in its nonlinear forms.
24Absence of the control variables (and a1 = 1), (24) reduces to the special case (22) with  = 1 and  = 1.
We see below the coe¢ cient estimate of a1 is close to unity.
25We use GMM-HAC (GMM heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors). The HAC
mechanism uses the Bartlett kernel and the variable bandwidth of Newey-West.
26Note that one can rewrite (22) as having a level variable on the left-hand side and a unit coe¢ cient of
a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side.
27By construction, eq. (7) implies that increasing public capital (for a given private capital) enhances the
productivity of private capital and conversely.
28This is in line with the fact that rms often need su¢ cient time to relocate to new roads and railways, for
instance, in their reinvestment decisions. An interacting variable (between public and private investment)
turns out not to be signicant in this longer data set. The growth model (in Section 2) does not feature such
phenomena due to the particular production functional form adopted. However, note that the application of
standard production functions is justied technically, as they are well-behaved and, often, provide tractable
solutions.
29Cavallo and Daude (2011) nd a negative e¤ect of public investment, but they do not use any non-linear
specication.
30We use the residuals from regression of equation (28) to run panel unit root tests. The unit root
hypothesis is always rejected, indicating co-integration of the variables in the equation. Using the Breusch-
Godfrey test for serial correlation in the presence of endogeneity, we have also re-run the regression with
lagged residuals added to the regression. The lagged residuals turn out to be insignicant, indicating an
absence of serial correlation and of the corresponding potential bias in the coe¢ cients.
31A world income equation is not part of the simultaneous equation estimation as it leads to a near
singular matrixresult. However, a separately estimated auxiliary equation for the world income growth is
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used for the simulations. See Appendix B.5.
32Standard errors of regression are reported in Appendix B.
33The simulation starts in 1960 when the earliest data are available for the estimation of the quadratic
time trends.
34There is no steady state as population growth rate keeps changing.
35Even at a discount rate of 12 percent the optimal public investment rate in both simulations is at least
8:4 percent, which is still higher than the actual end-of-panel average value.
36The variables RGDPCH, GPBI, GPRI, POP, WLD stand for real GDP per capita level, public invest-
ment/GDP percentage, private investment/GDP percentage, population, and world income respectively.
37Note that more observations are lost from the relatively good 1960s, thus giving more weight to the
weak growth years afterwards.
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Tables and Figures
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Figure 1a. Benchmark simulation, using estimates from the Simultaneous equations estimation
(i) Population and GDP per capita growth ratesa
(ii) Public and private investment (%GDP)a
(iii) GDP and consumption per capitab
Notes:
CONSUM - Consumption per capita. NETINC - Net income per capita. See Table 1 for the rest of variables
denition.
aSimulation time horizon covers 1960 to 2100.
b Simulation time horizon covers1960 to 2030.
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Figure 1b. Benchmark simulation, using estimates from the Separate equations estimation
(i) Population and GDP per capita growth ratesa
(ii) Public and private investment (%GDP)a
(iii) GDP and consumption per capitab
Notes:
See Table 1 for variablesdenition.
aSimulation time horizon covers 1960 to 2100.
b Simulation time horizon covers1960 to 2030.
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Figure 2. E¤ects of raising public investment to 8.4% the optimal value under the simultaneous equations
estimation
Figure 3. E¤ects of raising public investment to 9.3%  the optimal value under the separate equations
estimation
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for 33 SSA countries, 1967-2011
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
GDPPC 1807 2019 2504 3467
GRGDP 0.006 0.101 0.023 0.112
PUB/GDPa 6.06 4.47 7.26 5.26
PRI/GDPa 9.3 8.8 11.45 5.3
POP Growth 2.66 0.011 2.43 0.0066
1967-2011 2008-2011
Notes:
GDPPC - GDP per capita (PPP); PUB/GDP - Public investment/GDP percentage; GDPGR - GDP per
capita growth rate; PRI/GDP - Private investment/GDP percentage; POP Growth - Population growth
rate.
aMeans inferred from the panel average of the natural logarithm in line with the model. This di¤ers from
the panel average taken directly, which is one or two percentage points higher
Source: The data for GDP per capita (base year 2005) are obtained from the PWT 8.0. The data for the
public and private investment variables are from the African Development Indicators while population data
are from the World Development Indicator.
Table 2. Public investment GDP shares that maximize the sum of discounted consumption gains under
various discount rates and estimation methods
Time horizons
Discount rates 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.12
Separatea 9.50% 9.30% 9.20% 9.60% 9.50% 9.30% 9.60% 9.50% 9.30%
Simultaneousb 8.40% 8.40% 8.40% 8.10% 8.30% 8.40% 8.10% 8.30% 8.40%
2050 2100 2900
Notes:
aEstimates from the Separate equations estimation are used.
bEstimates from the Simultaneous equations estimation are used.
Source: Own calculations.
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Table B.1. Endogeneity in the growth regressionsa
Regressor p-val in system IV used Regressor p-val in system IV used remarks
d(log(1-gpbi/100)) 0 log(1-gpbi(-1)/100) log(1-gpbi/100) 0 d(log(1-gpbi(-1)/100)) endogenous
d(log(gpbi/100)) 0 log(1-gpbi(-1)/100) log(gpbi/100) 0 d(log(gpbi(-1)/100)) endogenous
d(lngpri(-1)) 0.6031  lngpri(-2) lngpri(-1) 0.3419 d(lngpri(-2)) predeterminedb
d((D(LNPOP))2) 0.145 (D(LNPOP))2 D(LNPOP))2 0.4331 D((D(LNPOP(-6)))2) ex./predeterminedf
d(log(wld)) 0.0034 LOG(WLD(-2)) log(wld) 0.7625 D(LOG(WLD(-2))) predeterminedc
Private invest. Eq. Public Invest. Eq.
d e g
LOG(GPRI(-1))-LOG(GPRI(-2)) 0.2901
Notes:
aTests analogous to Durbin-Wu-Hausman test; both stages without time dummies.
bAssuming exogeneity, using the regressor as instrument and doing the DWH test yields signicant e¤ects
of the residuals, which should not happen under exogeneity.
cAs the level is not correlated with the residuals, but the di¤erence is there must be either forward endogeneity
or/and correlation with the previous residuals, i.e. predeterminateness.
dIt follows from the growth equation that GDP per capita growth depends on lagged investment and therefore
on the lagged residual of the investment equation; therefore it is predetermined.
eAs growth depends on public investment without lag it must be correlated here with the residuals and
therefore it must be endogenous. The di¤erence of the private investment is exogenous although the levels
depend on public investment squared and cubed in the private investment equation with six lags and could
lead to predeterminateness. Taking the residuals of the private investment equation and adding the sixth
lag to the public investment equation leads to an insignicant result though.
fAssuming exogeneity also in the level equation, using the regressor as instrument and doing the DWH yields
a signicant e¤ect of the residuals. The level variable is indicated as exogenous in both cases.
gIn spite of the high p-value we consider the variable not as exogenous. It was also endogenous in the
previous regression, which is very similar.
Table B.2. Coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variables under GMM and xed e¤ects
Estimation Separate Simultaneous
Equation Growth Priv Inva Pub Inv Growth Priv Inva Pub inv
GMMSYS 0.97 0.762 0.8 0.971 0.706 0.628
FELS 0.91 0.715 0.733 0.91 0.58 0.477
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Table B.3. GMM properties for separately estimated equations
Growth 1 Priv Inv Pub Inv
no of coefficients Kg 51 45 47
instrument rank  L 102 139 89
L-Ka 51 94 42
J 0.023 96.151 51.147
Observations 831 787 653 828
p(nJ)i 0.9998 0.419 0.157
1st order ser.cor.b
coeffcients 0.052 -0.060 -0.103
p-values 0.188 0.180 0.007
2nd order ser.cor.c
coeffcients -0.086; -0.096 0.062 0.071
p-values 0.09; 0.0783h 0.251 0.127
s.e.e.d 0.109 0.328 0.332
stdev  fixed effectse 0.053 0.156 0.144
variance ratiof 0.241 0.226 0.189
Notes:
a Calculated as numbers of variables L-K including time dummies in the growth regressions, but per obser-
vation in investment equations.
b We save the residuals of the level equation and regress them on their own lag. We use cross-section and
time xed e¤ects, and panel-corrected standard errors of the period SUR type to correct for serial correlation
in this regression.
c Second-order serial correlation is obtained for regressing the di¤erence of the residuals on their second lag
(Roodman 2009b). This can be implemented in two ways. (1) Saving the residuals of the di¤erence equation
and regressing it on its own second lag. (2) Savings the residuals of the level equation and regressing its
di¤erence on it is own second lag. We run and report both versions.
d Standard error of estimation for the level equation.
e Standard deviation of xed e¤ects.
f Ratio of stdev of xed e¤ects and s.e.e., the two cells above this one.
g Including time dummies. There is one instrument per regressor, but the growth equations have constraints
on the coe¢ cients also for the time dummies.
h The rst method has 774 observations; the second has 661. Rejection of 2nd order serial correlation seems
justied even when allowing a 10% level.
i For the growth models and the systems the J-statistic has to be multiplied by the number of observations
n. The p-value is close to unity when we use only one instrument per regressor. If time dummies and their
related coe¢ cient restrictions were not included in the count we would get p=0.065 although we use only
one instrument per regressor and because the coe¢ cient restrictions between the two equations make the J
statistic increase away from zero.
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Table B.4. Correlation between the residuals of the equations
CorrelationSeparate equations
Probability growth priv inv publ inv popgr world gr
RESID Trend Trowth 1
-----
RESID Priv inv -0.13391 1
0.0009 -----
RESID Publ inv 0.0021 -0.01119 1
0.9586 0.782 -----
RESID Pop Growth -0.07661 0.05152 0.026693 1
0.0578 0.2024 0.5091 -----
RESID World Inc model -0.01818 -0.01033 -0.02008 0.010493 1
0.653 0.7984 0.6195 0.7953 -----
